Social Behavior Seminar
6 events
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Seminar TomorrowCooperating on networks: inequality and social structure
May 27 (Wed) 14:00 - 15:00, 2026
Manuel Staab (Lecturer, University of Queensland, Australia)
We analyse how inequality in endowments and social structure jointly affect individuals' ability to cooperate. Individuals repeatedly invest in a local public good ("cooperation'') in an environment that is described by a distribution of endowments and a network of beneficiaries. We measure the cooperativeness of an environment by the minimum discount factor needed to sustain (any) cooperation in equilibrium. We characterise the endowment distribution that maximises cooperativeness for any given network and the corresponding minimum discount factor. The latter is shown to be inversely proportional to the maximal index of the graph describing the network. The corresponding dominant eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix characterises the most cooperative income distribution. Moreover, we show that if an environment maximises cooperativeness (over all income distributions and networks of a certain size), then the network is described by a nested split graph. We further show that this is the same class of graphs that maximise welfare for any given discount factor, and yet, the most cooperative graph need not be equal to the most efficient.
Venue: Seminar Room #359 (Main Venue) / via Zoom
Event Official Language: English
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Seminar TodayHarnessing inequality for cooperation
May 26 (Tue) 14:00 - 15:00, 2026
Maria Kleshnina (Senior Lecturer, School of Mathematical Sciences, Queensland University of Technology, Australia)
Inequality in resources is widely thought to undermine cooperation in social dilemmas. Yet cooperation among unequals is ubiquitous: between senior and junior colleagues, firms of different sizes, nations with asymmetric stakes. Here, we offer a resolution to this puzzle and derive a novel prediction: if the returns from cooperation are shared in accordance with the individuals' strategic incentives, inequality enables and strengthens cooperation. We develop a strategic framework to systematically explore cooperation when the returns of a joint project can be shared unevenly. We characterise the optimal sharing rule, which we call resilient sharing, that can sustain cooperation in repeated interactions when no other rule can. Resilient sharing equalises incentives to defect across players, but is neither egalitarian nor proportional. Surprisingly, it typically rewards weaker partners beyond their relative contributions. We show that cooperation can be sustained through direct reciprocity in any environment whenever individual contributions are sufficiently unequal. Evolutionary simulations and a behavioural experiment confirm the central prediction: under resilient sharing, cooperation succeeds among unequal partners where it fails among equals. This suggests that cooperation is more likely to evolve and thrive when individuals can vary contributions and divide returns flexibly, pointing to the role of institutions and norms in harnessing inequality to stabilize cooperation.
Venue: Seminar Room #359 (Main Venue) / via Zoom
Event Official Language: English
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Seminar
On Mean-Field Games
May 21 (Thu) 10:30 - 11:30, 2026
Antoine Diez (Research Scientist, Mathematical Application Research Team, Division of Applied Mathematical Science, RIKEN Center for Interdisciplinary Theoretical and Mathematical Sciences (iTHEMS))
Stochastic differential games with a large number of players are notoriously challenging, both theoretically and numerically, typically when it comes to computing Nash equilibria. Yet, when many players interact somehow symmetrically by responding only to the average behavior of the others, the game can surprisingly become more tractable by taking the limit of an infinite number of players. This is in direct analogy with the so-called « mean-field theory » which simplifies the analysis of large systems of interacting particles in statistical physics. Introduced independently about two decades ago by Lasry and Lions (mathematics) and Caines, Huang and Malahamé (engineering), the theory of Mean-Field Games has since been greatly developed with various applications in engineering, economical, social and biological sciences. The goal of this short lecture is to introduce the key concepts, particularly the deep connections between game theory, Partial Differential Equations and stochastic analysis, and to showcase a few striking recent applications.
Venue: Seminar Room #359 (Main Venue) / via Zoom
Event Official Language: English
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Seminar
The math that shows a perfect democracy is impossible
April 23 (Thu) 10:30 - 11:30, 2026
Brian Andrew Mintz (Postdoctoral Researcher, Mathematical Social Science Team, Division of Applied Mathematical Science, RIKEN Center for Interdisciplinary Theoretical and Mathematical Sciences (iTHEMS))
Groups need to make decisions, and there are a wide variety of ways this can be done, each maximizing different notions of fairness. Social Choice Theory provides a mathematical framework to investigate these possibilities rigorously. Infamous for its many impossibility results, this topic reveals some fundamental limits to democracy. Beyond this, we'll discuss potential resolutions to these problems, as well as their real world implications.
Venue: Seminar Room #359 (Main Venue) / via Zoom
Event Official Language: English
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Seminar
Introduction to Game Theory #3
November 27 (Thu) 11:00 - 12:00, 2025
Yohsuke Murase (Team Director, Mathematical Social Science Team, Division of Applied Mathematical Science, RIKEN Center for Interdisciplinary Theoretical and Mathematical Sciences (iTHEMS))
An introductory lecture on game theory to promote potential interdisciplinary collaborations. No prior knowledge is required — the lecture is intended for non-experts. We will cover the fundamental concepts to help you build an intuitive understanding of how game theory analyzes strategic interactions. After briefly reviewing the previous lectures, we will talk about repeated games, where players are engaged in games repeatedly.
Venue: via Zoom (Main Venue) / Seminar Room #359
Event Official Language: English
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Seminar
Introduction to Game Theory #2
November 6 (Thu) 11:00 - 12:00, 2025
Yohsuke Murase (Team Director, Mathematical Social Science Team, Division of Applied Mathematical Science, RIKEN Center for Interdisciplinary Theoretical and Mathematical Sciences (iTHEMS))
An introductory lecture on game theory to promote potential interdisciplinary collaborations. No prior knowledge is required — the lecture is intended for non-experts. We will cover the fundamental concepts to help you build an intuitive understanding of how game theory analyzes strategic interactions. After briefly reviewing the previous lecture, we will discuss mixed-strategy Nash equilibria and their computational complexity.
Venue: Seminar Room #359 (Main Venue) / via Zoom
Event Official Language: English
6 events