Harnessing inequality for cooperation

Inequality in resources is widely thought to undermine cooperation in social dilemmas. Yet cooperation among unequals is ubiquitous: between senior and junior colleagues, firms of different sizes, nations with asymmetric stakes. Here, we offer a resolution to this puzzle and derive a novel prediction: if the returns from cooperation are shared in accordance with the individuals' strategic incentives, inequality enables and strengthens cooperation. We develop a strategic framework to systematically explore cooperation when the returns of a joint project can be shared unevenly. We characterise the optimal sharing rule, which we call resilient sharing, that can sustain cooperation in repeated interactions when no other rule can. Resilient sharing equalises incentives to defect across players, but is neither egalitarian nor proportional. Surprisingly, it typically rewards weaker partners beyond their relative contributions. We show that cooperation can be sustained through direct reciprocity in any environment whenever individual contributions are sufficiently unequal. Evolutionary simulations and a behavioural experiment confirm the central prediction: under resilient sharing, cooperation succeeds among unequal partners where it fails among equals. This suggests that cooperation is more likely to evolve and thrive when individuals can vary contributions and divide returns flexibly, pointing to the role of institutions and norms in harnessing inequality to stabilize cooperation.